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Abstract. Physical protection system (PPS) is created at a nuclear object to prevent 
unauthorized acts regarding to nuclear materials, nuclear installations, points of storage of 
nuclear materials and other items under physical protection. The ability of the PPS to prevent 
unauthorized actions of intruder was adopted as the main criterion for evaluating the efficiency 
of the physical protection system. The article considers the possibility of creation of the 
intruder analytical model to determine time indicators of overcoming boundaries of protection 
of nuclear object by an intruder with set features. 
1.  Introduction 
Physical protection system integrates people, procedures  and equipment for the protection of assets or 
facilities against theft, sabotage or other malevolent attacks. Among critical facilities, nuclear facilities 
and nuclear weapon sites require the highest level of PPS. Thus, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) adopted a convention [1] and published documents outlining requirements for 
physical protection at nuclear facilities [2]. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the 
U.S.A., the international community, including the IAEA, have made substantial efforts to protect 
nuclear material and nuclear facilities. These efforts include the Nuclear Security Fund established by 
the IAEA in 2002 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched by the USA and 
Russia in 2006. 
Principles of physical protection are realized through administrative and technical measures, 
including physical barriers. The measures for the physical protection of nuclear material in use and 
storage and during transport, and of nuclear facilities presented herein are recommended for use by 
States as required in their physical protection systems. These measures are based on the state of the art 
in physical protection hardware and systems and on the types of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 
Physical protection system consisting of the physical protection personnel, organizational and 
technical measures and actions carried out by it, as well as complex of the physical protection 
engineering & technical facilities, should perform the following tasks: prevention of unauthorized 
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actions; prompt detection of unauthorized actions; hindering (slowing down) the intrusion 
(advancement) of offenders; responding to unauthorized actions of offenders and neutralization of 
such in order to prevent the unauthorized actions. 
The implementation of the basic principles when designing a physical protection system is aimed at 
achieving the required level of system efficiency, which is determined by its ability to resist 
unauthorized actions of intruders regarding to physical protection items. A numerical value 
characterizing the effectiveness of the physical protection system is a system efficiency index. Its 
value is determined during the assessment of the effectiveness of PPS subject to certain external and 
internal threats, the list of vulnerabilities and the model of the intruder. 
2.  Efficiency index 
PPS is a complex system, which includes a variety of structural and functional subsystems. One of the 
basic properties of PPS as an integrated system is ability to work in conditions of uncertainty. The 
latter leads to the need of defining efficiency index that has stochastic nature. 
The ability of the PPS to prevent unauthorized actions of the intruder is taken as the main criterion. 
The probability of suppression of the intruder action (𝑃𝑠) is considered as an efficiency index, since the 
fact of restraint is a random event. In general, the suppression can be considered as a combination of 
the following events: intruder detection by technical means of PPS, the delay of the intruder in the 
progress toward goals, reaction and neutralization of the intruder action [3]. In this approach, the 
probability of suppression of unauthorized actions in relation to items under physical protection can be 
described by the formula [4]: 
 𝑃𝑠 = 𝑃𝑑𝑡𝑃𝑑𝑙𝑃𝑛 (1) 
 probability of timely detection of unauthorized actions of the intruder (𝑃𝑑𝑡) is determined by 
the characteristics of detection equipment and capabilities of the security forces; in the first 
case it can be derived from the detection equipment technical characteristics, in the second – 
on the basis of available statistics or as a result of simulation; 
 the probability of delay and slow progress of the intruder (𝑃𝑑𝑙) represents the quantile of a 
random variable of time delay, i.e. the probability that the delay t is not less than a 
predetermined value (𝑡𝑑𝑙): 
 𝑃𝑑𝑙 = 𝑃(𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑑𝑙) (2) 
The calculation of 𝑃𝑑𝑙, as a rule, is carried out using simulation and requires knowledge of time 
needed for physical barriers overcoming by different types of intruder, who differs in action tactics, 
special training, level of technical equipment, etc. 
 the probability of neutralization of an intruder by the guard forces (𝑃𝑛) represents the quantile 
of a random variable generated at the slice implementation of random functions, defined as 
"neutralization" in a fixed moment of time t. 
Simulation is commonly used to determine the value of 𝑃𝑛 based on special programs. 
Currently, the most prevalent approach to evaluate the effectiveness of security systems in models 
of the functioning of the PPS is the approach which examines possible scenarios of unauthorized 
actions and routes of intruder to locations of physical protection items in protected areas on the object. 
Further, the system's ability to counter the actions of intruders on selected routes is assessed. 
In this case, the choice of the efficiency index should meet the following requirements [5]: 
 representativeness - strict compliance of the indicator to security system goals; 
 sensitivity – a sufficient change of the value of efficiency index when changing the most 
important parameters and initial data describing the system and affecting its effectiveness; 
 simplicity – a lack of mathematical difficulties in the calculation of the efficiency index; 
 visibility – clear physical meaning of the defined indicator. 
The ability of the PPS to prevent unauthorized actions of intruder was adopted as the main criterion 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the physical protection system. System efficiency is measured by 
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quantitative indicators, reflecting the probability of restraint of the intruder's actions by the security 
forces, acting on the alarm. 
Efficiency index depends on threats, model of the intruder and vulnerabilities that were adopted in 
the process of analyzing the nuclear object. Following indicators are used to assess the effectiveness of 
the physical protection system [6]: 
 differential efficiency index takes into account the probability of preventive action against the 
intruder to one target. When considering multiple scenarios of the intruder action against 
selected targets, the differential indicator of the effectiveness of the physical protection system 
of this vulnerability is taken equal to the minimum (worst) value among all the considered 
scenarios. The scenario of the intruder's actions, corresponding to the minimum value of the 
probability of preventing actions against selected targets, is adopted as the critical; 
 integral indicator represents an average efficiency index of physical protection system for 
nuclear object with regard to the rank of targets importance. 
The realized approach involves using the probability of suppressing the actions of the intruders 
moving along the route, providing the maximum probability of success with minimal time to achieve 
the goal, as the primary indicator of the effectiveness of physical protection systems [7]. Elements of 
the route that intruders have to overcome in different ways depending on intruder chosen tactics are 
engineering tools (i.e. physical barriers), areas of open terrain, the construction elements of buildings, 
premises and facilities, equipped with means of detection and control. Overcoming each element of 
the route is characterized by tactics, method, time of intruder movement and the probability of their 
detection by technical means of physical protection, site personnel, guard forces. Further measures are 
taken to intercept, block and neutralize intruders. 
3.  Intruder model 
Intruders can be separated into three classes: 
 outsiders; 
 insiders; 
 outsiders in collusion with insiders. 
For each class of intruder, the full range of tactics (i.e., deceit, force, stealth, or any combination of 
these) is considered. Deceit is the attempted defeat of a security system by using false authorization 
and identification; force is the overt, forcible attempt to overcome a security system; and stealth is the 
attempt to defeat the detection system and enter the facility covertly. Adversary capabilities include 
knowledge of the PPS, level of motivation, skills useful in carrying out the attack (e.g., knowledge of 
the safety systems), the speed with which the attack is carried out, and the ability to carry and use tools 
and weapons. 
Theft and sabotage may be prevented in two ways: by deterring the adversary or by defeating the 
adversary. Deterrence occurs by implementing a PPS that is seen by potential adversaries as too 
difficult to defeat; it makes the facility an unattractive target. In addition, legal ramifications 
associated with attacking a site may deter some adversaries, although not a determined one. The 
problem with deterrence is that it is impossible (or, at least, extremely difficult) to measure, and 
therefore, will not be discussed further. Defeating the adversary refers to the actions taken by the 
protective or response force to prevent an adversary from accomplishing his goal once he actually 
begins a malevolent action against a facility. There are three major functions that the PPS must 
perform. These include: detection, delay and response. 
The goal of an adversary is to complete a path with the least likelihood of being stopped by the PPS. 
To achieve this goal, the adversary may attempt to minimize the time required to complete the path. 
This strategy involves penetrating barriers with little regard to the probability of being detected. If the 
adversary completes the path before the  guards can respond to interrupt his activities, he is successful. 
Alternatively, the adversary may attempt to minimize detection with little regard to the time required. 
If the adversary completes the path without being detected, he is successful. 
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Selection and description of the intruder model is one of the key issues for creating an effective 
physical protection system, as the characteristics of the intruder determine the shape, the functionality 
and the structure of the security system. Characteristics and the parameters of an intruder in its 
mathematical nature can be divided into three groups [5]. 
Random with a non-stochastic nature. The values of these parameters for the intruder could not be 
identified in the analysis of preparation for the implementation of the illegal action or by analytical 
methods described in the formation of an intruder model. An example of such a parameter may be the 
following: the intruder group size seeking to realize a threat. The common technique of working with 
these parameters is to assign probabilistic characteristics to these parameters by the using of various 
techniques. In many cases modification the mathematical nature of the parameters of this group are 
carried out through the use of one or simultaneously several methods of expert estimations. 
Random with a stochastic nature. The values of these parameters can be obtained statistically or 
with using specialized computer programs, based on a statistical database and implementing special 
procedures with them. Examples of such characteristics and parameters may be the following: intruder 
movement speed on the object site, the time of physical barriers overcoming, the chance to trigger the 
technical means of protection (detection) under different actions of the intruders and many others. The 
main difficulty when using parameters of this group is the lack of completeness of source data bases. 
At the same time, obtaining of any individual parameter of the intruder is time consuming and requires 
a large number of relevant experiments. 
Deterministic. The values of these parameters are constant and depending on the accepted 
limitations of the performed calculations. Examples of such parameters in the particular case may be 
the rate of fire of weapons, the power of explosives, the number of physical barriers that intruder must 
overcome when moving towards the location of the physical protection items at the nuclear object. 
The proportion of deterministic parameters in the totality of characteristics of an intruder model is 
small.  
Unauthorized actions against nuclear materials, nuclear installations and points of storage of 
nuclear materials are the set of actions aiming to overcome the boundaries of protection, movement in 
a protected area of a nuclear object in the direction of the physical protection items placement, 
participation in the armed clash with security forces. In this case, the time required for intruders to 
perform the task can be divided into time of overcoming the route elements and time of action with the 
target object. The time required for moving on a site between the selected boundaries of protection is 
determined by the speed of the intruder, the nature and length of the surmounted site and security 
forces actions. The value of the detection probability and the delay time at the turn of protection 
depends on characteristics of the technical means of physical protection and ways of overcoming the 
boundaries of engineering means. Analysis of the interactions in the system «intruder – PPS» allows to 
determine intruder general characteristics (technical equipment, level of physical training, group size) 
and tactics of action (power, covert, deceptive, or mixed) that affect the value of the efficiency index 
of PPS. 
Nowadays, time of physical barriers overcoming is determined by conducting exercises and by the 
expert way taking into account selected characteristics and parameters of the intruder. The exercise is 
difficult in organization, time-consuming and lengthy process, requiring usage of large number human 
and material resources. Thus, obtained data allow covering only a small sample of events with 
different initial conditions, and data in most cases are random with the stochastic nature. The 
characteristics may be determined by the laws of random variables distribution or parameters of these 
laws. 
Data obtained by the expert estimates has low reliability and directly depends on the subjective 
views and competence of the expert. The original data obtained by the expert estimates is recorded in 
the database as deterministic parameters and weakly depends on the characteristics and parameters of 
intruder model. In this case, there are difficulties of taking into account the level of skills and abilities 
of intruder in overcoming physical barriers due to their random nature. Usually there are three 
conditional levels of skills of the intruder in specialized programs: high, medium, low [8]. Also, 
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features and specifications (material, dimensions, fences, locations of obstacles) of physical barriers 
cannot be fully taken into account. All this reduces the reliability of results obtained in the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the nuclear object physical protection system. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Solving practical issues associated with the evaluation of the effectiveness of the nuclear object 
security system allows making a conclusion about the necessity for determining more accurate time 
values of overcoming actually installed physical barriers established within the existing security 
system. The approach allows to apply for this purpose the algorithm describing the motion of the 
intruder on the territory of the object and overcoming the boundaries of protection, taking into account 
the equipment, physical and physiological characteristics of the human body and other factors 
influencing the possibility of performing unauthorized actions. Its use in the definition of the source 
data to assess the effectiveness of the physical protection system will require the creation of analytical 
model of intruder actions. Obtained data allow to take into account the internal and external factors of 
the interactions in the system «intruder – PPS» that provide the maximum security of nuclear materials 
at the nuclear facility. 
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